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Comments
Rape: The Unstated Sentence
Homosexual rape has been recognized as a problem in American pris-
ons for many years.' The problem appears to be a malady universally as-
sociated with correctional confinement.2 The situation is especially
serious in institutions housing males. For this reason, the need is great for
the examination of homosexual rape in male occupied correctional insti-
tutions. While experts seem unable to estimate accurately the incidence of
sexual assault among inmates, they admit that the problem is serious and
has grave effects upon the victims.'
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
"cruel and unusual" punishment.4 A formal sentence assigning a criminal
to five years in a state penitentiary as a sexual pawn to a gang of fellow in-
mates would attract nationwide attention for its uniqueness and cruelty.
Any judge who imposed that type of sentence would be inviting reversal
and perhaps a reprimand. While sentences are not imposed in terms so
graphic, the stark reality is that for certain particularly vulnerable offend-
ers, a conventional prison term all too often may carry with it a sentence of
prolonged captivity under the constant threat of sexual assault.' Increas-
ingly, judges are beginning to recognize and consider this fact when sen-
tencing certain offenders.6
Convicts who are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault deserve pro-
tection from this type of abuse while serving their terms. The eighth
amendment apparently promises that protection. Legal and practical re-
1. LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 6-7 (1980); Note, SexualAssault and
Forced Homosexual Relationships in Prison: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 ALB. L.
REV. 428,431(1972).
2. Rideau & Sinclair, Prison: The Sexualiungle, in MALE RAPE at 3-4 (A. Scacco,
Jr. ed. 1982).
3. See infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.
5. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
6. Judge Barbieri, Court of Common Pleas, issued an unpublished order Sept. 26,
1968. See D. MCNAMARA & SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW 156 (1977).
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alities, however, make this promise rather hollow. Bureaucratic obstacles
and considerations of federalism often work to deny victimized inmates
any meaningful relief.8 The purpose of this comment is to outline the
causes of action currently available to highly vulnerable offenders, to
point out inadequacies of these actions, and to suggest innovative theories
for relief.
This comment will commence with a survey of the literature discussing
the prevalence and effects of sexual assault in correctional institutions,
and identifying the victims and aggressors.9 An analysis of sexual assault
in the context of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
will follow. This analysis will reveal that the likelihood for relief under the
federal Constitution is questionable, particularly in light of recent United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the prohibition against "cruel
and unusual" punishment.'" The federal district court case of Mostyn v.
Carlson," which contained an inmate's allegations of confinement under
cruel and unusual conditions including sexual assault, will be examined in
context with these recent Supreme Court decisions. An argument will be
made that under current federal constitutional law, a particularly vulner-
able inmate may have a better chance for preventative relief under Cali-
fornia constitutional principles."1 The sympathetic approach of the
Californiajudiciary toward the defense of "necessity" for the crime of es-
cape tends to support this view.'3 The California cases of People v. Ander-
son 14 and People v. Lovercamp15 will be shown to support an independent
interpretation of the California Constitution, which is more favorable to
inmate suits. 6 Finally, alternatives to conventional sentencing will be
suggested, with special emphasis on practicable options for highly vulner-
able first offenders. 7
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
To appreciate the urgency of finding a consistently useful theory of re-
lief for highly vulnerable prisoners, several aspects of the problem must be
7. See infra notes 100-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 18-69 and accompanying text.
10. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
see infra notes 100-54 and accompanying text.
11. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-2687 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 1983) (order granting pre-
liminary injunction); see infra notes 132-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 152-201 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
14. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152(1972).
15. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
16. See infra notes 166-201 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
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understood. The first aspect to be discussed is the statistical incidence of
sexual assault. This discussion will be followed by an identification of the
likely victims and aggressors of homosexual rape. Finally, the effects of
sexual assault upon the victim will be examined.
A. Statistics
Criminologists and psychologists agree that violence among prisoners,
and especially sexual assault, is a very real problem.18 Statistical litera-
ture, however, is scant, and the literature that does exist is contradictory. 19
Some commentators have stated that actual rapes are rare.20 Conversely,
other studies have produced shocking figures that suggest that the inci-
dence rate for sexual assaults hovers at over 40% for particularly vulnera-
ble inmates in some institutions.2
One of the most recent independent studies analyzed the incidence
rates of reported and unreported 22 sexual assaults that occurred at an un-
named California prison.3 The researcher concluded that 14% of the in-
mates at that prison would be sexually assaulted while incarcerated.24 The
California Department of Corrections, in an official 1974 report, listed a
rape incidence of 4.3 per 100.25 Because of notoriously poor reporting
records, however, that reported rate is believed to be low.26
A low recorded rate for the incidence of rape does not indicate that the
problem is nonexistent. Any thorough analysis of these rates must con-
sider that the records upon which the official statistics are based suffer
from gross underreporting.27 Several factors discourage inmates from re-
porting assaults. Prisoners often fear reprisals from the very assailants
18. See People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212, 213 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); P. Clute,
The Legal Aspects of Prisons and Jails 74 (1980); D. LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIO-
LENCE2 (1980); MALE RAPE vii (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982); Robbins & Buser, Punitive Condi-
tions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of
State Prison Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 913
(1977).
19. Compare D. LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE 92 (1980) with C. FEL-
TON, VIOLENCE IN PRISON (paper presented to Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
(1979), cited in L. BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION 21 (1980)).
20. LOCKWOOD, supra note 18, at 92.
21. W. WOODEN & J. PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN
PRISON 18 (1982). Inmate interviews in a California state institution indicated 14% overall
rate of sexual assault, with homosexuals reporting the highest rate of attacks at 41%. Id.
22. "Unreported" incidents refer to assaults which do not appear on official prison
records but which were corroborated by other inmates. Many times inmates simply do not
report these attacks to the guards. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
23. WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 21, at 5.
24. Id. at 18.
25. L. BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION 24-25 (1980).
26. Id at 26. Bowker also estimates that a prisoner serving a twenty year sentence
runs a 1 in 67 risk of being murdered while incarcerated. Id
27. Id. at 2-3. One hundred fifty-six assaults were documented, yet only 96 were re-
ported, and, of those, only 64 were actually listed in prison records. Id
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they would report.28 The "Convict Code," the unwritten rules of conduct
enforced by the inmates themselves, mandates punishment for "rat-
ting." 9 Furthermore, inmates are unlikely to be eager to publicize their
humiliating experiences. Once a prisoner acquires a reputation as a "punk
boy,"3 he is vulnerable to even further harrassment and attack.3' This
reputation can follow the inmate from one institution to the next. In addi-
tion, many victims also fear the reaction of their families to news that they
are no longer "real" men.32
An accurate statewide picture of the problem of homosexual rape in the
California penal system, then, is almost impossible to obtain. Beginning
in 1983, however, the California Department of Corrections began tabu-
lating more accurately the incidence of sexual assaults.33 Before 1983, all
sexual incidents, including consensual sexual behavior, were grouped to-
gether under the heading of "sex." 34 Only obvious sexual assaults were in-
cluded under incidents of "assault. ' 35 This change in reporting method
indicates that the state has finally recognized the need for accurate and
meaningful monitoring of prison sexual violence. This closer analysis of
the sex-related incidents in California prisons should alert officials that
certain types of prisoners are the most likely victims of rape because not
all inmates are equally vulnerable to sexual victimization.
B. Victims andAggressors
Despite the lack of agreement over incidence rates, a consensus on the
characteristics of the classic victim does exist.36 The most vulnerable in-
mate typically is a white, middle-class male with a slight build who pos-
sesses a youthful and attractive demeanor.37 He is also likely to be a first
offender who has been convicted of a property crime, such as car theft.
This offender need not have a violent encounter with a victim to perpe-
28. See People v. Harmon, infra note 188, at 214; WOODEN & PARKER, supra note
21, at 60.
29. See H. TOCH, LIVING IN PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SURVIVAL 166-67 (1977).
30. The term "punks" in the prison context, refers to young, small inmates who are
used for the sexual gratification of older stronger inmates. Tucker, A Punk's Song: View
from the Inside, in MALE RAPE 66 (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).
31. See BOWKER, supra note 25, at 14-15.
32. See generally id. at 1.
33. Telephone interview with Richard Bass, Research Analyst for Offender Infor-
mation Services for California Department of Corrections (Aug. 3, 1983) (copy on file at of-
fice of the Pacific Law Journal).
34. ld; Offender Information Services Branch, California Department of Correc-
tions, Inmate Incidents in Institutions 1970-1982, Table 2 (May 4, 1983).
35. Id
36. See BOWKER, supra note 25, at 11; LoCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 33-36.
37. BOWKER,supranote25,at 11.
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trate his crime.38 He usually does not project a dangerous personality.39
Inexperienced and lacking an air of machismo, this type of inmate is a
prime target for sexual victimization.
In addition to youthful first offenders, two other categories of inmates
are highly vulnerable to the threat of sexual assault: male-to-female
transsexuals and effeminate gays.' Transsexuals in the final stages of
transformation are particularly vulnerable because of their feminine ap-
pearance and mannerisms.41 For these individuals who have not yet com-
pleted their transformation, life in a male penitentiary can be terrifying.
The vulnerable inmate often is left with limited choices for survival. A
violent outburst in reaction to the very first sexual advance is often con-
sidered by veteran inmates to be the best defense to a future encounter.42
This response also establishes a "straight" image.43 If the prisoner is un-
able or unwilling" to make a physical display of his dangerousness, often
the safest course of action for a target is to find an older, stronger
'Jocker." 45 A jocker is an inmate who offers the target some measure of
protection in exchange for a long-term commitment to give the jocker
whatever sexual favors he requests.46 Unfortunately, the target will re-
main subject to the whims of his "protector." The unwritten convict code
sanctions only two types of pairing, jocker and punk boy or effeminate
homosexual. Even professed homosexuals are not tolerated as couples.47
Each homosexual is expected to pair up with ajocker.
To protect the victim of sexual violence as adequately as possible, likely
aggressors must be identified and efforts must be made to understand
their motivations. Aggressors, interestingly enough, consider themselves
to be heterosexual, which is one reason why they pick on inmates who
more closely resemble females.48 Unfortunately, in our penal institutions
today, an inmate's manhood and physical prowess most commonly are
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See Note, The Rights of Gay Prisoners: A Challenge to Protective Custody, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1980); Gardner, For Transsexuals, Prison is "Ten Times as
Tough," CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE Feb. 1981, at 32,32-33.
41. BOWKER, supranote25, at 141.
42. Id. This sort of self-help remedy is often recommended by the guards them-
selves when an inmate complains of sexual harrassment; however, it will often result in
punishment, delayed release or parole. Id. LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 141.
43. Id.
44. During the Vietnam War many conscientious objectors of the Quaker faith
were imprisoned. Because of their pacifist beliefs, they were highly vulnerable. They re-
fused to fight back when assaulted. Tucker, TheA ccount of the White House Seven, in MALE
RAPE 30-57 (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).
45. "Jocker" is the term used for the aggressor in a prison rape. He plays the mascu-
line role while the "punk" or effeminate gay plays the submissive feminine role. See C. SIL-
BERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 526 (1978).
46. WOODEN & PARKER, supra note 21, at 18.
47. Id at 19.
48. LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 32.
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demonstrated by raping his fellow inmates.4 9
From all reports, aggressors are predominantly black." Numerous the-
ories have been advanced for this phenomenon. Sociologists have sug-
gested that blacks choose white victims out of racial animosity.5' The large
number of blacks in our prisons does not explain the situation fully. While
the prison population is composed of a disproportionate number of
blacks,52 the statistics on aggressors and victims do not follow purely
mathematical ratios. 3 If the incidence of black aggressors were purely a
function of racial percentages, then racial profiles of victims would reflect
a similarly disproportionate number of blacks. Victims, however, are
predominantly white. Because the reason behind aggressors being
predominantly black is unclear, solutions to the problem are more diffi-
cult to design. 4 A solution, though, must be found soon because the ef-
fects on the victim inmate resulting from the threat of attack and actual
attack are staggering.
C. The Effects
The prolonged stress of living with verbal harrassment and the constant
threat of physical abuse and rape takes an inevitable psychological toll
even on inmates who are not themselves assaulted.55 Only a few members
of a group need actually be assaulted for the entire group to feel vulnera-
ble.56 The resultant fear itself is damaging.57
Specifically, fear raises the level of violence in an institution. 8 Even in-
mates who are not likely victims learn quickly to behave in aggressive
ways to deflect potential sexual advances.59 Also, victims often begin to
49. Miller, Foreward to MALE RAPE (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).
50. LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at I.
51. Scacco, Jr., The Scapegoat is Always White, in MALE RAPE (A. Scacco, Jr. ed.
1982).
52. See SILBERMAN, supra note 45, at 160-61; BOWKER, supra note 25, at 8-9.
53. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 2.
54. Classification and segregation of inmates based on racial criteria, while argua-
bly sensible based on this data, does raise constitutional issues based on the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment and component of the fifth amendment. See infra
note 221 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, all too often prison guards themselves have been documented as ag-
gressors. Bartolls, Staff Exploitation of Inmates: The Paradox of Institutional Control, in
MALE RAPE 195 (A. Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982). Correctional institutions are increasingly sensi-
tive to this outrageous situation and are making efforts to screen job applicants better and
abolish the practice of using other inmates as supervisors. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). This comment, however, will focus on intra-inmate violence.
55. See BOWKER, supra note 25, at 15.
56. LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 143.
57. Once a victim has submitted from fear he may begin to doubt his masculinity.
See id at 1.
58. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
59. BOWKER, supra note 25, at 15.
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react violently in an attempt to end their submissive roles.60 The brutaliza-
tion of the victim is poignantly displayed by one victim's comment: "Even
though I defeated fear with hate, I destroyed myself."61
Exposure to rape or the threat of rape, in addition, also may effect a
young inmate's sexual orientation permanently.62 Some psychologists
suggest many professed homosexual inmates might not be homosexual
had they never been incarcerated under conditions that subjected them to
being physically abused or to witnessing the sexual victimization of fellow
youthful inmates.63 Many youthful offenders who have been sexually ex-
ploited throughout their incarceration find heterosexual relationships
very difficult to establish upon their release.64
Inmates who are unable to break out of their victim role often take the
path of least resistance and submit consensually.65 Some of these inmates
are unable to accept the demoralizing experience of becoming prison
"prostitutes. 66 Some mutilate themselves;67others commit suicide.68
One of the traditional functions of imprisonment is rehabilitation.69
This function, however, will be rendered meaningless if the effects of rape
in prison continue to be tolerated. Rehabilitation seems a cruel irony for
vulnerable inmates. Victimized inmates rarely, if ever, will return to soci-
ety better adjusted or less violent than they were when they entered the
system.
As demonstrated, sexual violence is a serious problem in our penal sys-
tem that effects certain types of inmates more seriously than others. The
prison sentences imposed on these particularly vulnerable inmates should
not include sexual harrassment and abuse. Once imprisoned, these in-
mates need a remedy. The eighth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution seems a logical basis for providing that remedy.
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
The eighth amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishment has undergone various interpretations since its ratification. This
60. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 100.
61. Id. (from inmate interview ARE- I).
62. See BOWKER, supra note 25, at 15.
63. Id
64. See Tucker, A Punk's Song: View from the Inside, in MALE RAPE 72-73 (A.
Scacco, Jr. ed. 1982).
65. Id at 64.
66. See BOWKER, supra note 25, at 1.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 142.
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section will begin with the history of those interpretations. 0 An analysis of
the current status of the eighth amendment as a theory of relief for inmates
imprisoned under conditions including a high threat of sexual assault will
conclude this section.71
A. History
Originally, the eighth amendment was read as little more than a prohi-
bition against punishments which had recently been abolished in Eng-
land." One of the earliest decisions that expanded the protections of the
eighth amendment was Weems v. United States.73 In Weems, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a sentence of fifteen years at hard labor
was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed--falsi-
fying a public document.74 Judicial review in that case, however, was lim-
ited to the sentence imposed and did not include an evaluation of the
actual punishment suffered by the criminal.75
Courts continued to deny review of prisoners' claims of unconstitution-
ally harsh treatment actually received under the inmates' imposed
sentences for the next fifty years.76 The judiciary refused to inquire into
the supervision of state prison conditions by state correctional officials.77
So long as the official punishments mandated by state legislatures and or-
dered by statejudges complied with minimum constitutional standards of
type and proportion, the United States Supreme Court declined to inter-
fere in state prisQn administration.78
In 1964, however, the Warren Court79 began to change the previous pol-
icy of nonintervention. The Supreme Court held for the first time, in
70. See infra notes 72-99 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 125-59 and accompanying text.
72. Note, Creatures, Persons, and Prisoners: Evaluating Prison Conditions under the
Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099, 1101 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Crea-
tures]; see also Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted." The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
Drawing and quartering had been a popular punishment for centuries. See Note, Sex-
ual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationships in Prison: Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 36 ALA. L. REV. 428,429 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, SexualAssaults].
73. 217U.S.3249(1910).
74. Id. at 380-82.
75. Note, Creatures, supra note 72, at 1101-02.
76. See Note, SexualAssaults, supra note 72, at 430.
77. Note, Prison Overcrowding and Rhodes v. Chapman: Double-ceiling by What
Sltandard?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 713,716-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Prison Overcrowd-
ing].
78. Note, Creatures, supra note 72, at 1101-02.
79. The "Warren Court" generally refers to the years ofjudicial activism when Earl
Warren presided as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. See Note, The New
Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 28 STAN. L. REV.
297,299 n. 13 (1977). The years of 1953-69 were marked by many other landmark decisions
such as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
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Cooper v. Page,8" that prisoners had standing to sue under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 for violations of their constitutionally protected rights.8" The
first major cases using this remedy challenged the draconian prison sys-
tem in Arkansas.82 Investigation revealed that violence and sexual abuse
by guards and inmates existed in epidemic proportions throughout the
system. 3 The cases of Holt v. Sarver (1)84 and Holt v. Sarver (11)85 identified
conditions of confinement posing so serious a threat of rape or stabbing
that many inmates clung to the bars at night hoping to escape attacks
while they slept.86 Starting with the Arkansas cases, the lower federal
courts began to develop a broader definition of "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishment as applied to conditions of confinement.
Modern definitions of "cruel and unusual" punishment have varied,
but several phrases seem to form a common thread among recent cases. In
1958, Trop v. Dulles87 introduced the idea that the eighth amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."88 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that loss of citizenship was too severe a punishment
for desertion.89 This type of punishment offended the very dignity of
man.9" More recently, "cruel and unusual" punishment has been defined
as "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 91 and "totally without
penalogical justification." 92 The Weems 93 concept of punishment,
"grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime," 94 is still accepted
as a definition of improper sentencing. The eighth amendment, however,
now is applied to the conditions of confinement as well as to the punish-
ment mandated.95 One condition of confinement for vulnerable inmates is
the high risk of sexual assault. The time has come for recognition of the
right of inmates to be free from the constant threat of attack. This author,
80. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
81. Id. at 546.
82. Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) affid, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
83. 309 F. Supp. at 376-77 (inmates were used as trustees to supplement free world
guard staff).
84. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
85. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
86. Id. at 376-77.
87. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 101; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346. In Trop the Court also ruled
that "unusual" added nothing of substance to the prohibition against "cruel" punishments
as modernly understood. 356 U.S. at 100 n.32.
89. 356 U.S. at 104.
90. Id. at 100.
91. Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion).
92. Id. at 183.
93. 217U.S.349(1910).
94. Seeid. at 367.
95. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825
(E.D. Ark. 1969).
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therefore, proposes that the eighth amendment affords vulnerable in-
mates a cause of action.
B. The Right To Be Freefrom SexualAssault
Given the modern development of eighth amendment interpretations,
the question remains whether inmates have a cause of action against con-
finement under conditions that include a serious threat of sexual assault. 6
The first court, however, to recognize specifically an inmate's right to be
reasonably protected from sexual assault was the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In Woodhous v. Virginia,97 the Fourth Circuit held that,
[W]hile occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another
may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment .... confine-
ment where violence and terror reign is actionable. A prisoner
has a right secured by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, to
be reasonably protected from the constant threat of violence
and sexual assualt by fellow inmates, and he need not wait until
he is actually assaulted to obtain relief.98
Woodhous seemingly would support a highly vulnerable inmate's right
to be free from sexual assault under the eighth amendment. The court
opened the way for a damage suit against state prison officials if a prisoner
could establish that (1) a pervasive risk of harm from other inmates ex-
isted, and (2) officials were not exercising reasonable care or were creating
an unreasonable risk.99 Woodhous, however, was only a circuit court deci-
sion, and the United States Supreme Court since has interpreted the
eighth amendment in ways which well may hamper an inmate's petition
for confinement that is secure against sexual assault.
C. Rhodes v. Chapman: A Retreat?
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Rhodes v. Chap-
man1" has been read as evidencing a substantial retreat from the trend to-
ward expanding prisoners' rights developed during the Warren years.'0 '
Prior to Rhodes, several lower courts had held that overcrowding, and the
96. See 300 F. Supp. at 831; 309 F. Supp. at 376; see also Williams v. Edwards, 547
F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp .318,324-25 (1976); Gates v.
Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 889 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
97. 487 F.2d 889(1973).
98. Id. at 890.
99. Id.
100. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
101. See Note, The Effect ofRhodes v. Chapman on theProhibitionAgainst Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 744-45 (1982); Note, Prison Overcrowding,
supra note 77, at 746,753,760; Note, Rhodes v. Chapman: Prison Conditions As Cruel and
UnusualPunishment, S. TEX. L.J. 374 (1981); supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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doublebunking necessitated by population increases, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment,' These courts had accepted expert testimony
warning that prolonged confinement with minimal space per inmate cre-
ated stress and hostility, raising the levels of all forms of violence, includ-
ing sexual assault. 10 3 Some judges had even set a minimum standard for
cell size based on experts' consensus that fifty square feet was the absolute
minimum."° Rhodes unequivocally holds that overcrowding itself does
not amount to "cruel and unusual" punishment, at least in the absence of
proof of other aggravating circumstances." 5
The district court in Rhodes originally held that the prison conditions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 06 The inmates alleged that the
crowding resulting from a prison population exceeding design capacity by
over thirty-eight percent had created numerous constitutionally imper-
missible conditions.0 7 Inmates claimed that violence had increased as a
direct consequence of the doublebunking necessitated by the crowding. 08
These inmates also complained that security and staff were insufficient, as
were medical, food, and ventilation facilities. 10 9 The district court, how-
ever, was unable to find any factual support for most of the prisoners' alle-
gations. 110 Acknowledging the modern design and facilities of the
institution, the court was able to find substantiation only for the com-
plaints regarding a reduction in job and rehabilitation opportunities."'
Ultimately, however, the district court found that these deprivations, to-
gether with doublebunking and reduced per capita cell space, amounted
to "cruel and unusual" punishment.'12 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, 13 but the United States Supreme Court reversed the holding. 4
Eight justices' of the United States Supreme Court declined to rule
that these prison conditions amounted to "cruel and unusual" punish-
102. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732,743 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.
2d 1241 (5thCir. 1977); see also Nicholson v. Choctaw Co., 498 F, Supp. 295,308 (S.D. Ala.
1980) (dictum).
103. See BOWKER, supra note 25, at 164-65.
104. 423 F. Supp. at 743.
105. 452 U.S. at 348-51.
106. 434 F. Supp. at 1022. Court order allowed state 90 days to develop a plan to alter
double cells. Id.
107. Id. at 1021.
108. Id. at 1014-15.
109. Id. at 1009.
110. Id. at 1014-18.
111. Id. at 1018.
112. Id. at 1021.
113. Rhodes v. Chapman, 624 F.2d 1099 (1980).
114. 452U.S.at352. .
115. Only Justice Marshall dissented, finding on the facts that the conditions of con-
finement violated the 8th and 14th Amendments. Three justices, however, joined Bren-
nan's concurrence which emphasized that this decision was not a return to the old "hands-
off" policy of pre- 1960jurisprudence but only a factual decision. 452 U.S. at 352-53.
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ment. "6 Prisoners' rights advocates find two things disturbing about the
decision. The majority opinion used language demonstrating a great def-
erence to prison administrators' decisions" 7 and rejected the use of expert
testimony that indicated the significant effects upon inmate behavior
caused by overcrowding." 8 The majority used federalist rhetoric' 9 which
suggested that in the future, the Court would be less willing to scrutinize
state prison administrators' policy decisions aimed at coping with the
problem of overcrowding.2" The opinion asserted that considerations
such as crowding, reduced rehabilitation opportunities, prolonged con-
finement in cells, and other consequences of the strain on budgetary allot-
ments for prisons were more "properly weighed" by prison officials and
legislators than by federal judges.'2' The majority chided activist judges
saying that the courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison of-
ficials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution.' The ma-
jority seemed to imply that state prison policies concerning conditions of
confinement should be respected.
This deference to the decisions of state prison officials followed an ear-
lier Supreme Court decision, Belly. Wolfish, 23 that was handed down two
years before the Rhodes decision. In Bell, the majority advocated'granting
ministerial decisions made by prison administrators "wide-ranging defer-
ence."'2 4 By echoing the sentiments of this earlier case, Rhodes may have
established a pattern of noninterference in prison conditions. The current
position of the Court apparently is that state prison officials are most
competent to decide how to deal with shrinking resources and increasing
inmate populations. Given the deference paid to prison officials in Bell
and Rhodes, a successful eighth amendment challenge to overcrowded
conditions does not appear likely.
D. Viability of Eighth Amendment Challenges after Rhodes
A cause of action to gain relief from sexual assaults might also prove un-
successful after Rhodes v. Chapman. An argument can be made, however,




119. The concept of federalism as used in this paper refers to the political philosophy
that great deference should be shown to the actions and decisions of the states as states, andis related to the old "states' rights" arguments which proliferated in the pre-Civil War
southern states. See generally Note, Prison Overcrowding, supra note 77, at 717, nn.36-37.
120. 452 U.S. at 349-52.
121. Id. at 349.
122. Id. at 352.
123. 441 U.S. 520(1979).
124. Id. at 547.
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should be read narrowly on its facts. This interpretation would leave via-
ble the protections promised by Woodhous.'2 After all, the Rhodes major-
ity assured that the federal courts would not ignore the duty to protect
prisoners' constitutional rights when conditions of confinement actually
amount to "cruel and unusual" punishment. 126
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Rhodes, in which he wasjoined
by two other justices, offers more encouragement. This concurrence
stressed that its position was strorigly based on the findings of fact made
by the district court. Since the district court found that none of the depri-
vations alleged by the inmates was supported by the evidence except for
rehabilitation andjob opportunity reductions,127 the result reached by the
majority was inevitable. Justice Brennan emphasized, however, thatjudi-
cial intervention is indispensable to the enforcement of the eighth amend-
ment. 28 Presumably, if an inmate could prove that the incidence of sexual
assault was high enough, a federal court would hold that confinement
under these conditions constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment. The
problem, then, becomes one of gathering evidence 129 sufficiently shock-
ing, as in Woodhous, to convince the court to overlook the deference given
the decisions of state prison officials in the administration of their institu-
tions. Since Rhodes rejected expert testimony on the dangers of over-
crowding and its effects upon inmate behavior, 3 ° a case based solely on
expert testimony pointing out the damaging effect that living under the
threat of rape has on a vulnerable inmate probably has been foreclosed.
This leads to the conclusion that an inmate would not be able to win a suit
unless he had already been raped several times and could introduce suffi-
cient corroborating evidence of the attacks. The eighth amendment,
therefore, currently does not offer any meaningful relief for the many in-
mates who are living under the constant threat of rape or for those inmates
who have been raped, but who are unable to provide documentation of
their attacks and remain in danger of continued abuse. 3'
One recent California district court case, Mostyn v. Carlson,3 2 did grant
an inmate relief based on an eighth amendment sexual assault theory. The
facts of the case, however, were strong and the ruling cautious and narrow.
This writer has concluded that Mostyn is an illustration of the limited
125. 487 U.S. 889(1973).
126. 452 U.S. at 352.
127. Id. at 347-49.
128. Id at354.
129. The problem of underreporting has been discussed earlier in this comment. See
notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
130. See 452 U.S. at 348-49; Note, Prison Overcrowding, supra note 77, at 747.
131. The difficulty of obtaining reliable corrobating evidence of prison assaults has
been discussed earlier in this comment. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
132. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 1983).
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scope of protection provided to highly vulnerable inmates under the cur-
rent interpretations of the eighth amendment. These inmates need pre-
ventative protective measures. They should not have to wait and suffer
until their files are filled with sufficiently shocking incident reports to sup-
port a suit for the limited kinds of relief granted in Mostyn.
An examination of the facts of Mostyn illustrates the shocking nature of
the sexual harrassment which was an incident of Ms. Mostyn's imprison-
ment. In 1982, Anna Marie Mostyn instituted a suit against the Federal
Bureau of Prisons and the Director, Norman Carlson. 33 At the time of her
incarceration, Ms. Mostyn was a preoperative male-to-female transsexual
who, despite her obviously feminine appearance, retained male genita-
lia. 34 Ms. Mostyn, therefore, was classified legally as a male. 35 The plain-
tiff alleged that her confinement among the male population at the State
Medical Correctional Facility at Vacaville and several federal prisons
amounted to "cruel and unusual" punishment because of the sexual har-
rassment to which she was subjected. 136
After many humiliating incidents and at least one rape,'37 Ms. Mostyn
was assigned almost indefinitely to segregation units for her protection. 38
During the course of her lawsuit, however, she was threatened with re-
moval to the general male population. 139 Ms. Mostyn's petition for a pre-
liminary injunction against that type of a transfer eventually was granted
by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California in
April 1983 over objection by the United States Attorney's Office. 140
Counsel for the United States government argued that the court should
defer decisions about prison housing to the discretion of corrections ad-
ministrators. 141 In support of this position, counsel cited Rhodes, 14 Bell v.
Wolfish, 143 and several Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions.144 Each
133. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-2687 (filed Sept. 21, 1982).
134. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 at 4. (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1983) (order granting
permanent injunction).
135. Seeid at3.
136. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 43, Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108
(filed Jan. 10, 1983).
137. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 at 9 (May 19, 1983)(order granting permanent
injunction).
138. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 43, Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108.
Segregation units are usually used as a form of punishment. See infra notes 222- 24 and ac-
companying text.
139. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities, in support of Application
for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 (filed Mar. 3, 1983).
140. Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108. (April 20, 1983).
141. Government's Opposition to Temporary Restraining Order at 8-11, Mostyn v.
Carlson, No. 82-1108 (April 20, 1983).
142. 452 U.S. 337.
143. 441 U.S. 520. Day-to-day operations are best left to prison administrators'judgment as needed to preserve internal order and discipline. Id. at 546-48. See also supra
notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
144. Hoptowitv. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982). Inmate suit against conditions
of confinement which included abuse by guards and tortious conditions in protective cus-
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of these cases involved challenges to the conditions of confinement in
state prisons. Relying on the holdings of these cases, the government ar-
gued that Ms. Mostyn's papers supporting her petition for injunctive re-
lief failed to present facts sufficient to establish that prior administrators
had abused their discretion by exaggerating their response to the situation
or by acting capriciously to violate Ms. Mostyn's constitutional rights. 14
5
The district court, however, relied on the older eighth amendment cases
such as Woodhous, 14 acknowledging that the state has a responsibility to
protect the safety of its prisoners.1 47 The court granted the injunction,
thereby protecting Ms. Mostyn from transfer to the general male popula-
tion. The court, however, dismissed Ms. Mostyn's damage suit against
Carlson and other prison officials and was very careful to qualify its deci-
sion to grant injunctive relief.1 48 The order was specific on one point: the
decision was not meant to set a general precedent for the confinement of
transsexuals, effeminate gays, and transvestites.149 The ruling was based
solely on the facts presented.
The cautious ruling in Mostyn succeeded in extricating Ms. Mostyn
from her intolerable situation. 5 Prison administrators were enjoined
from transferring Ms. Mostyn to the general male population. The court
also suggested keeping her segregated, and stated that if neutral adminis-
trative segregation was unavailable, Ms. Mostyn should be housed in the
female side of the institution.151 The court also ordered that while housed
in administrative segregation, Ms. Mostyn should have all the privileges
allowed to the general prison population.
52
The Mostyn case does little to advance the cause of particularly vulnera-
ble inmates. The court sidestepped the Rhodes153 rule of deference by find-
ing facts sufficient to bring the situation beyond the reach of routine
administrative decisions. Ms. Mostyn was able to document an actual
sexual assault and several incidents of harrassment while confined with
males in several penal institutions.154 Parts of the decision no doubt were
based on judicial notice. Ms. Mostyn was five feet, four inches tall and
tody units. Id. at 1237. "[P]rison reform is an executive or legislative responsibility." Id. "at
1246. This case goes on to cite Rhodes for support of only the narrowest remedy for an obvi-
ous constitutional violation. Id. Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1982). In this
case, another prison conditions suit, the inmates complained of first amendment viola-
tions. Id. at 787. "The courts accord decisions of prison official's extreme deference ... espe-
cially in matters of internal security." Id at 789.
145. Supra note 141, at 10-11.
146. 487 F.2d 889 (1973).
147. Mostyn, No. 82-1108, at4.
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id at 8-9.
152. Id at 9.
153. 452 U.S. 337.
154. Mostyn, No. 82-1108, at 3.
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very feminine. Little imagination is needed to recognize that confinement
of this type of person among males unable to engage in conventional het-
erosexual activity would be dangerous.
While Rhodes is not an absolute bar to inmate petitions against the con-
ditions of their confinement,'55 the case is at least an indication of the di-
rection in which the majority of the United States Supreme Court is
moving: nonintervention except in the most shocking of cases. Not all
courts will be able or willing to make findings of fact that override the def-
erence that Rhodes mandated.'56 Rhodes, therefore, may prove an insur-
mountable obstacle for many inmates. Especially affected will be inmates
merely threatenedwith sexual assaults because they cannot produce docu-
mentation of attacks. 57 Those inmates will not be allowed to introduce
expert testimony warning of the effects that fear alone can have on a pris-
oner. 58 Since the United States Supreme Court is unlikely, at this date, to
expand prisoners' rights, 59 inmates who are likely targets of sexual har-
rassment are left without a legal theory that supports their demands for
preventative steps. These inmates should not be forced to wait until they
have endured sufficient pain before the discretion of officials can be over-
ridden. Another source of authority is needed. At least for state prisoners,
a challenge based on an independent interpretation of the California Con-
stitution offers an alternative route for relief.
INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
The progressive tone of the Warren Court certainly has been tempered
by the more conservative philosophy espoused by the Burger Court. 160 In
response to this trend, some state courts have developed independent in-
terpretations of their own state constitutions to better preserve individual
freedoms. 6' California courts are among those that do rely on their own
state constitution to ensure the protection of fundamental rights.
155. Wilson v. Deukmejian, No. 103454 (Marin Co. Super. Ct. 1983); see L.A. Daily
Journal, Aug. 30, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
156. 452 U.S. at 337.
157. See supra notes 26-34, 131 and accompanying text.
158. Seesupranotes 118,130-31 and accompanying text.
159. Seesupra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
160. This refers to the Nixon and Ford appointees: Burger, Powell, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and Stevens.
161. Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation ofthe State Cotn-
stitution, 20 STAN. L. REV. 297,297 (1977); 425 U.S. 435,454-55; see U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 454-55 (1976) (Brennan's dissent urging such action by state courts); Michigan v.
Mobley, 413 U.S. 96, 121 (1976) (Brennan again dissented).
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A. California Supreme Court Cases
The California Supreme Court, as the court of last resort for state con-
stitutional rulings, recognizes the obligation to give independent meaning
to constitutionally guaranteed rights. 62 The parameters of the right to pri-
vacy, for example, are much broader under California law'63 than under
federal law. Likewise, the rights of prisoners have received additional pro-
tection.1 4
Independent interpretation of parallel provisions of the United States
Constitution and a state constitution is most easily justified and logically
developed when an actual textual difference exists between the two provi-
sions. 65 For example, the California Supreme Court took advantage of a
textual variation to hold in People v. Anderson166 that the death penalty
was unconstitutional "per se." 167 This ruling was based upon the Califor-
nia version of the eighth amendment contained in the California Consti-
tution which is textually different from the federal eighth amendment. 68
Article I, section 17169 of the California Constitution prohibits the imposi-
tion of "cruel or unusual" punishment, whereas the eighth amendment to
the United States Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment. The use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive in the Califor-
nia Constitution implies that both punishments that are "cruel" and
punishments that are "unusual" must be banned. This distinction encom-
passes a potentially wider range of punishments than the federal provi-
sion. In addition, the difference lends support to an inmate's petition for
an independent interpretation providing relief from the serious threat of
sexual assault. Although the textual variation has been noted, the defini-
tions of "cruel" and "unusual" remain elusive.
In Anderson, the California Supreme Court took the opportunity to de-
162. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929,939-40 n.10, 588 P.2d 237,245 n.10, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 109, 117 n.10(1975).
163. California amended its constitution to provide specifically for a right to pri-
vacy. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §1; see B. WITKIN, 5 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §274A (8th
ed. Supp. 1980).
164. See infra notes 167-96 and accompanying text.
165. See Note, supra note 79, at 305-07. The California Supreme Court has also been
willing to make an independent interpretation when parallel provisions are textually iden-
tical. In Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766, 557 P.2d 929, 945, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367(1976), the court held that education, in California, is a fundamental right. Id. at 163-66,
557 P.2d at 942-45, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 364-67. The court declined to limit its citizens' rights
by the restrictive equal protection analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 144 (1973).
166. 6 Cal. 3d 628,493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152(1972).
167. See id at 651, 656,493 P.2d at 895, 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167,171. This decision
was overruled by constitutional referendum adding §27 to art. I of the California Constitu-
tion. However, §27 merely seems to negate the specific ruling in Anderson with regard to the
death penalty, not the general interpretation of the terms and their textual differences. Id.
168. 6 Cal. 3d at 641-45,493 P.2d at 888-91, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 160-63.
169. Formerly CAL. CONsr. art. I, §6.
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fine "cruel" under the California Constitution. 1 0 The court reaffirmed its
decision 7' to borrow the federal definition of "cruel," first enunciated in
Trop v. Dulles," to interpret section 17 of the California Constitution, 173
the prohibition against "cruel or unusual" punishment. The Trop
formula, which defines constitutional violations under the eighth amend-
ment, is based on an "evolving standard of decency."' 174 This standard
considers the psychological effects 175 of punishment that subject an in-
mate to ever-increasing fear and distress. 176 The standard is much more
liberal than the current standard espoused by the United States Supreme
Court."7 Inmates who are living in fear under the serious threat of rape,
but who have not yet been attacked, should find encouragement in the
sensitivity of the California court to punishments that are psychologically
damaging. The state court forum seems much more promising than the
federal, because Rhodes appears to have foreclosed the use of the fear of
rape as a basis for a successful eighth amendment suit.
In addition to fixing the definition of "cruel," theAnderson court reiter-
ated the correctional policy of California.178 Retribution and vengeance
are insufficient state interests tojustify imposing a particular form of pun-
ishment. 179 Under California law, a punishment also must be necessary to
serve rehabilitative, security, or deterrence goals. 80 The retribution lan-
guage of Rhodes, therefore, may not apply to state scrutiny of state im-
posed punishment. The Rhodes decision considered conditions that were
harsh and restrictive to be part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay
for their offenses against society. 18' In California, prison administrators
must justify harsh conditions as serving something more than purely pu-
nitive purposes. 8 ' Conditions of confinement that include a high risk of
sexual assault, therefore, would not be an acceptable part of the punish-
ment for an inmate's offense.183
Under these California Supreme Court rulings, a state prisoner clearly
170. 6 Cal. 3d at 648,493 P.2d at 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
171. People v. Clark, 3 Cal. 3d 97, 99, 473 P.2d 997, 998, 89 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254
(1970).
172. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
173. 6 Cal. 3d at 650,493 P.2d at 895, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
174. 356 U.S. at 101.
175. 6 Cal. 3d at 650,493 P.2d at 895, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
176. 356 U.S. at 101.
177. While the Supreme Court has not overruled its holding in Trop, the rejection of
expert testimony delineating the psychological effects of overcrowding tends to emasculate
the ruling of Trop. See 452 U.S. at 340-49; supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
178. 6 Cal. 3d at 651,493 P.2d at 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 168; In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d
740,745,48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176,408 P.2d 948,952 (1965).
179. 6 Cal. 3d at 651,493 P.2d at 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
180. Id.
181. 452 U.S. at 347.
182. See 6 Cal. 3d at 651,493 P.2d at 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
183. Sexual assault does not improve rehabilitation. It does not improve security
since victims often become violent themselves. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying
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could state a cause of action under the California Constitution for a viola-
tion of the prohibition of "cruel or unusual" punishment. The standard to
be met would be less than under Rhodes because no obstacle of deference
need be overcome. The standard, instead, is based on the Trop "evolving
standard of decency." This allows meaningful relief for both the actual
rape victim and the inmate merely threatened with rape. Preventative re-
lief can become a reality. Furthermore, because of the California policy
on correctional goals and incarceration, California courts would be more
willing to scrutinize closely prison administrative decisions that impact
on conditions of incarceration. The sensitivity of California courts to the
conditions of confinement is evidenced by the recognition of a defense of
escape based upon an imminent danger of being sexually assaulted while
incarcerated.1 4
B. The Escape Cases
Another line of California cases, those dealing with escape, supports an
inmate's plea for relief from confinement that includes the threat of sexual
assault.'85 In 1974, a decision was rendered by the Michigan Court of Ap-
peal' 86 which was to have a profound influence almost immediately in
California.'87 In People v. Harmon,'88 the court ruled that duress caused by
the imminent threat of sexual assault was a legitimate defense to a crimi-
nal charge of escape from prison.8 9 Until the Harmon decision, courts had
resisted this type of ruling, even when a prisoner's claim of extreme miti-
gating circumstances was substantiated. 90 Reluctant to return an inmate
to a dangerous situation, judges had been even more hesitant to open the
door to escaping prisoners crying "rape."' 9 1
Almost immediately, a California court followed the Michigan lead
and accepted "necessity" based upon the imminent threat of serious in-
jury, death, or rape as a defense to the crime of escape. 92 The defendants
in People v. Lovercamp were female inmates at the women's medium se-
curity facility, the California Rehabilitation Center. These defendants
claimed to have been threatened repeatedly with rape and physical abuse
text. Deterrence is not advanced because only less violent inmates tend to become victims.
Seesupra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974).
187. People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974); see infra
notes 198-204 and accompanying text.




192. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
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by other inmates. 193
The Lovercamp court established limited parameters for the defense of
necessity and professed not to be making a new rule of law.194 Most com-
mentators, however, view the decision as both new and significant. Since
1974, the case has received mixed acceptance. 95 Nevertheless, in 1982,
the California Third District Court of Appeal joined the Fourth District
in acknowledging the existence of a necessity defense to escape. 96 While
this defense is narrow, its recognition reflects the sensitivity of California
courts to a prisoner's right to be free from sexual assault as delineated by
Woodhous.197
Although an inmate's remedies under post-Rhodes federal law have be-
come seriously limited,' these remedies appear not to be so restricted
under California law. The legal foundation for an inmate's suit under sec-
tion 17 of the California Constitution can be established by an independ-
ent interpretation of the California constitutional prohibition against
"cruel or unusual" punishment, 99 together with the correctional policy of
the state.200 The Lovercamp decision, read in conjunction with this state
constitutional framework, supports an inmate's petition for preventative
relief. Using a legal argument based on the constitutional and escape
cases, an inmate isjustified in requesting relief even before he is assaulted.
A threat of assault or a personal profile that labels him as a likely victim of
assault2"' should be a sufficient basis to seek judicial protection. The form
of this protection may be of several types.
TYPES OF RELIEF OR REMEDIES
Once an inmate has been able to establish an argument that a certain
form of confinement subjects him to cruel and/or unusual punishment,
the question of what form of relief he can reasonably expect to receive re-
mains. The final section of this comment will survey the forms of relief
currently available to inmates.20 2 The section will conclude with this
193. Id. at 825, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
194. Id. at 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
195. In re Grand Jury Proceeding v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant
attempted to raise duress to contempt for refusal to testify); People v. Condley, 69 Cal.App. 3d 999, 1008-10, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515,519-21(1977) (an affirmative defense, not an ele-
ment of the crime).
196. People v. Pritcock, 134 Cal. App. 3d 795, 184 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982).
197. 487 F.2d 889 (1973); see Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Es-
capefrom Prison -a Step Toward Incarceration Free From SexualAssault, 49 S. CAL. L. RgV.
110,112-13 (1975).
198. See supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 168-90 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 211-32 and accompanying text.
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writer's suggestion for a new sentencing procedure that would consider
each inmate's vulnerability to sexual assault under conventional forms of
confinement.2 °3
A. Self-Help
The convict code, which favors private solutions, continues to influence
inmate behavior in modem prisons.2' Unfortunately, most inmates re-
sort to self-help as a means of dealing with sexual aggression by fellow in-
mates.2 °5 Confronted with a sexual advance or an actual assault, many
inmates follow the advice of veteran inmates and often the guards, as well,
and fight back or attempt to escape.201 The worst part of this approach is
that the victimized inmate often finds himself punished for the assault by
losing "good time"20 7 for fighting. As a result of the assault, the inmate's
incarceration may be prolonged and his parole date delayed.2 8 More for-
mal means of relief, however, are available.
B. 42U.S.C.§1983
The most frequently used legal action to reform debilitating prison con-
ditions has been a tort action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.209 Under this
legislative enlargement of the fourteenth amendment, a prisoner may re-
ceive monetary compensation for a denial or abridgment of his constitu-
tional rights."0 Money, however, does not compensate adequately an
inmate who has been viciously raped, nor does it ensure that his confine-
ment will be qualitatively different after his section 1983 action has
proved successful. Courts also have been reluctant to hold prison officials
responsible for conditions that continue to exist, not so much because of
the administrator's callousness, as a lack of funding by the legislature.211
Section 1983, under certain circumstances, can also provide injunctive re-
lief.212 An inmate, however, needs protective measures that provide for his
security before-an assault occurs and the damage is done.
203. See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
204. LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 47.
205. Id. at 49.
206. Id at 51-55.
207. "Good time" refers to credit given by parole boards for good behavior.
208. LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 57.
209. See Note, Physical Sedurity in Prison: Rights Without Remedies?, 12 NEW ENG.
L.REv. 269,284-95 (1976).
210. Id.at285.
211. See Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901,904- 06 (7th Cir. 1971).
212. See42 U.S.C. §1983.
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C. Classification and Protective Segregation
Many prison systems employ another accepted means of controlling
prison violence: classification.2 13 When prisoners are first sentenced, they
are screened according to age, history of violence, and previous prison
time before being assigned a classification code. 214 The purpose of classi-
fication is to avoid putting young, inexperienced first offenders in the
same cell or area as more hardened criminals.215 Classification appears vi-
able since it is possible to compile both victim and aggressor profiles.
Unfortunately, recent legislation mandatingjail sentences for commit-
ting a crime with a gun,216 and a rise in the crime rate, in general, have
caused prison populations to swell dramatically.2 7 Legislative funding
for prisons has not kept pace with the expanding prison population.218
Overcrowding severely strains the flexibility and viability of any classifi-
cation system. Frequently, single rooms or low risk roommates are not
available for vulnerable inmates. Without the facilities to implement
prison classification properly, the remedy is worthless.
Additionally, efforts to classify inmates on a strictly statistical basis are
discouraged by civil rights and gay rights advocates.219 Although statisti-
cally blacks are more likely to be aggressors and whites are more likely to
be victims of sexual assaults,220 automatic segregation of inmates on a ra-
cial basis would raise equal protection and antisegregation attacks. 221
Similarly, gay rights advocates strongly object to segregation of gays
based solely upon their sexual preferences, especially if this segregation
includes a reduction in privileges.tm
The only other method consistently used to protect particularly vulner-
able inmates is "protective segregation." 223 Unfortunately, protective cus-
tody is often indistinguishable from solitary confinement, entailing the
same diminished privileges as administrative detention for punitive pur-
213. See H. BURNS, JR., CORRECTIONS ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
363-66(1975).
214. I& at 366, 368-69.
215. See id at 369.
216. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.
217. See SILBERMAN, supra note 45, at 41.
218. See452U.S.at351n.16.
219. Automatic segregation based on race or sexual orientation has been attacked on
equal protection and due process grounds. Not all blacks or masculine gays are high risk
aggressors; not all effeminate gay or young whites are high risk targets. Howarth has come
out against "protective" segregation for gays based on the reality that protective segrega-
tion usually means confinement with greatly diminished privileges. See Note, supra note
40, at 1270-71.
220. See supra notes 38,52-57 and accompanying text.
221. See generally LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at146-47.
222. Id; Note, supra note 40, at 1270-71.
223. SeeNote, supra note40, at 1225-27.
1984 / Rape
poses.224 Aside from the basic unfairness of this treatment, the gravity of
the situation is magnified because the vulnerable inmate, unlike the recal-
citrant inmate, must serve his entire sentence under these highly restric-
tive conditions. Courts have recognized that conditions which might be
tolerable as a temporary punishment are unconstitutional as a permanent
condition of confinement.22 Protective segregation, then, is not a viable
long-term remedy for the rape victim.
D. Innovations
Other forms of relief have been suggested. 6 Victimized inmates could
be transferred to another facility in order to remove them from the influ-
ence of their aggressors.227 Reputations, however, tend to follow in-
mates, 8 and the problem of sexual violence seems to permeate the penal
system. Preoperative male-to-female transsexuals could be integrated
into women's institutions or given the necessary surgery to complete their
metamorphosis. 29 Prison administrators, however, have been very reluc-
tant to stir up the controversy that either one of these options would be
likely to create."0 Inmates' attorneys have repeatedly suggested early re-
lease or probation for inmates who have been subjected to sexual victimi-
zation.23' A better solution, however, would be to restructure the
sentencing process so that inmates who are likely victims could be pun-
ished without being abused.
The remedies described thus far have inherent limitations.232 An inno-
vation that has the potential to be much more helpful to the potential rape
victim and to all of society is a supervised community residency program.
This remedy should be available only to offenders who have not been con-
victed of a violent crime. Proponents of this alternative estimate that ex-
isting programs could be expanded to include three to four times the
supervisory staff and counselling hours and still cost the state less than
what it now spends to feed, house, and supervise an inmate in a maximum
224. See Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578, 581 (4th Cir. 1972), (dissent); Sweet v.
South Carolina Dept. of Correct., 529 F.2d 854,868 (4th Cir. 1975), (concurrence); Nadeau
v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976), affd, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977); TOCH,
supra note 29, at 206.
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226. See infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
227. See generally Mostyn v. Carlson, No. 82-1108 at 3 (May 19, 1983) (order grant-
ing permanent injunction).
228. LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 146.
229. See Gardner, For Transsexuals, Prison Is "Ten Times as Tough, "CORRECIONS
MAGAZINE Feb. 1981, at 32, 33-34.
230. See generally idt at 32-34.
231. American Bar Association Commission on Correctional Facilities and Serv-
ices, Prisoners' Rights Litigation Manual 123 (1974) (working paper available at Univer-
sity of San Diego Law Library).
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security unit.3 Of course, this type of program frequently is confronted
with strong community opposition. No one wants a halfway house in his
neighborhood.
The most significant aspect of the halfway house alternative, though, is
that the typical inmate who becomes a victim of sexual assault has not
been convicted of a violent crime. ' Therefore, he is less likely to pose a
threat to the community. This fact, if made known to the community,
should help lessen the hostility toward halfway houses. The threat of reas-
signment to a conventional prison would always remain as a deterrent to
inmates who fail to cooperate with the rehabilitation program offered by a
community supervised facility.
After examining the constitutional and humane considerations at
stake, alternative sentencing to halfway houses should be a routinely
available option for the sentencing judge in cases not involving violent
crimes. Of course, the offender would have to meet certain criteria in order
to qualify for this type of program. If thejudge thinks the offender might
qualify, he would order an in-depth psychological screening similar to the
screening routinely performed for classification purposes. If the offender
does not evidence a violent personality, if he is young, attractive, and not
heavily built, and if he lacks an extensive previous prison record, he would
qualify for halfway house sentencing on a probationary basis. Lack of co-
operation would be a ground for reassignment to a conventional prison
setting. With sufficient supervisory and counselling staff and in-depth
screening on nonviolent offenders, alternative sentencing would be the
answer to the highly vulnerable inmate's dilemma. This remedy would
provide the preventative remedy lacking under the current federal consti-
tutional structure.
CONCLUSION
Homosexual rape is not a constitutionally or ethically acceptable pun-
ishment. It is, however, too frequently a part of a vulnerable inmate's cor-
rectional experience. The effects upon actual victims, and upon inmates
who live under the constant threat of becoming victims, are devastating
and include increased rates of suicide and antisocial behavior.235 Over-
crowding, which has become the rule and not the exception in Califor-
nia, 6 neutralizes the positive result that an effective classification system
233. American Bar Association, supra note 231, at 123.
234. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
236. California Governor Deukmejian was quoted as saying that overcrowding in
the state prisons "has reached beyond the breaking point..." L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 8,
1983, §1, at 1, col. 6.
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could have upon this problem. 7 If rehabilitation is to remain a serious
correctional goal, California must overcome budgetary constraints to en-
sure the lowest sexual assault rate practicable within the state prison sys-
tem.
Any aggravation of the problem falls heaviest upon the inmates most
likely to become targets of sexual aggression.238 This comment has ana-
lyzed the current status of an inmate's eighth amendment challenge to the
conditions of his confinement which include a high risk of sexual victimi-
zation. After the United States Supreme Court ruling in Rhodes, a success-
ful challenge to state prison conditions has become less likely. Unless an
inmate has already suffered sexual assault during his confinement and
can substantiate his claims, he has little hope of gaining relief. The pur-
pose of this comment has been to suggest another source of relief: the Cal-
ifornia Constitution.
The California Supreme Court has adopted the practice of indepen-
dently interpreting its own state constitution. No longer limited to federal
interpretations of parallel state and federal constitutional provisions,
California can, and has, extended protection to the individual rights of its
citizens, including criminals, beyond the protections mandated by the
United States Constitution.
Establishment of a right to secure conditions of confinement without a
meaningful form of protection is a hollow victory. Perhaps repeated court
rulings of unconstitutional confinement will be required to spur the legis-
lature to enact responsible legislation providing secure and humane cor-
rectional confinement. Alternative sentencing to a halfway house for
highly vulnerable inmates could prove to be just the type of preventative
form of relief that these prisoners desperately need in the interim.239
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